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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff**SUBJECT : Suitable Topics for Comparative Evaluations****REFERENCE : Memorandum from Special Assistant to the President, dated 19 June 1958, subject, "Comparative Evaluations Group"**

TS 165044

1. General Cutler has suggested that I forward to you a list of those topics which we consider suitable for comparative evaluations of U. S. and Soviet weapons systems. In selecting these subjects three criteria seem relevant: (a) the weapons systems selected should be of major importance; (b) sufficient intelligence on the Soviet weapons system should be available to provide a basis for comparison; and (c) the topics considered should be broad enough in scope to permit meaningful comparisons, yet within manageable proportions.

2. With these criteria in mind, we propose the following topics for consideration:

a. Strategic Bomber Attack Capabilities. To be most meaningful, this topic should not be confined to the Soviet Long Range Air Force and SAC, but should include all types of bomber attack capabilities against the U. S. and U.S.S.R., including U. S. carrier task forces and theater air forces, where applicable. Air-breathing missiles should probably also be included. This comparison should cover not only the delivery vehicles themselves but associated equipment, support facilities, base structure and dispersion, state of training, inflight refuelling, and similar factors.

b. Long-Range Ballistic Missile Systems. It would be simplest to confine this comparison to the relative state of development of U. S. and Soviet ICBMs. This comparison might be more meaningful, however, if IRBMs were included, in view of the fact that from overseas bases the U. S. can use IRBMs against targets deep in the U.S.S.R.

(EXECUTIVE REGISTER FILE JCS

c. Nuclear Weapons Production Capabilities. This topic would be confined to capabilities for the production of weapons grade fissionable materials, and of different types of nuclear weapons. Delivery systems would not be included as they would be covered elsewhere. It would also be difficult to compare the specific numbers of weapons of each broad type in the Soviet and U. S. nuclear stockpiles because there is little quantitative evidence on the Soviet side and no precise intelligence estimate has been feasible.

d. Air Defense Weapons Systems. This subject would be quite broad, but to be meaningful should include analysis of such facets as weapons capabilities, warning systems, order of battle and deployment, and state of training and operational readiness.

e. Anti-Submarine Warfare Capabilities. We believe that this topic too should be treated broadly; it should cover not only the comparative state of the art but also tactics and training and state of operational readiness.

f. Submarine Weapons Systems. This subject would be difficult to treat on a comparative basis (except insofar as the relative state of the art is concerned) because of the broadly different primary missions for which the U.S. and Soviet submarine forces are designed. A comparison of numbers of submarines, for example, would not be very meaningful.

g. Ground Force Weapons Systems. Here too comparisons on other than a state of the art basis would be of limited value, because of the vastly different force structures and strategic missions involved.

h. Biological and Chemical Warfare Capabilities. Since the U.S.S.R. is believed to have a program of some magnitude in this field, a study of relative capabilities would be desirable.

i. Weapons Research and Development. Although this topic is less precise than those above, it is believed that a broad comparison of weapons research and development facilities and techniques, including among other things comparative lead times, different methods of developing designs, and comparative effort devoted to this field, might be of considerable value. It might be possible to use specific past weapons developments as case study examples.

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3. Of the above suggestions, I believe that topic a., strategic bomber weapons systems, would be the most desirable to undertake as an initial exercise. Not only are many of the weapons systems involved already in existence, giving a valid basis for comparison, but the intelligence community has just completed a new national estimate on Soviet Long Range Aviation. Since the NSC was recently briefed on comparative US-USSR progress in the ICBM field, this subject could be reserved for later re-examination, perhaps as the second evaluation. In this connection, a new NIE on overall Soviet missile capabilities should be available about 1 August 1958.

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ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

ODCI:RWW:jts (30 Jun 58)

Distribution:

O&I - Fwd
2 - O/DCI ✓
1 - Gen. Cutler
2 - DDI
1 - AD/NE

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DULLES

In reply to our attached letter to General Twining regarding quarterly briefings, General Wentworth called General Cabell and asked that we do the first one on Wednesday, 2 July, at 10:30 AM.

I will remind you of this briefing sufficiently in advance to allow time to prepare for it. As you will recall, General Cabell recommended that he and Frank Wisner accompany you.

OK - *AWD/mc*

WSE 2 May

(DATE)

cc: Gen. Cabell

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	30 June 58
TO:		EO/DCI	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS: In his 19 June memo General Cutler suggests that by 1 July, DCI send the list of topics to Chairman, JCS.			
FROM:			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 30-3
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr Dulles

DATE: 7/2

FROM :

SUBJECT: Ref letter re "Comparative Evaluation"

Concur. Have no further
suggestions

LKT

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2 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Suitable Topics for Comparative Evaluations

1. I can suggest no change in the Director's memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would urge however that, among the topics therein listed, Topic d., Air Defense Weapons Systems, should be considered as one of the earliest to receive attention. I am not convinced that a comparative estimate of Strategic Bomber Attack Capabilities will be enormously valuable and quite a lot of attention has been focused in the last several months on comparative capabilities of ICBMs. My belief is that a comparative estimate of Air Defense Weapons Systems would reveal gross deficiencies on our side which can readily be remedied and which should receive attention.

2. I concur with all of the comments in Mr. Komer's covering memorandum to the Director.


RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Development

cc: Mr. Komer (O/DDI)

Attachments:

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TS-165044

Concur
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